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S. N. Balagangadhara wrote an essay entitled, 
“Translation, Interpretation and Culture: On the 
Disingenuity of a Comparative Theology,” which 
appeared in this journal in 2014.1 In it, Balagangadhara 
defends his theory of translation and supports that theory 
by deconstructing the field of comparative theology, 
which he finds unreflective and unsophisticated, at 
best. The tool of that deconstruction is a sharply critical 
assessment of several sections of my 2010 Comparative 
Theology.2 That book, meant to introduce readers to the 
field even while not being itself a work of comparative 
theological practice, draws on my other, earlier books, 
none of which Balagangadhara seems to have read.3 Given 
Balagangadhara’s sharply negative judgment on my work 
—assessing it to be fruitless, disingenuous, dissimulating, 
dishonest—I feel it necessary to respond to his essay, 
and I am grateful to Canadian Social Science for the 
opportunity to write this brief reply. I will first note some 
of his criticisms and respond to them. I then comment 
on what appears to be most crucial to Balagangadhara, 
his own theoretical reflections on translation at the start 
of the essay; I will note too how his comments on my 
work turn out to serve as a foil to his own theorizing, 
perhaps as a warning to those who do not work out their 
translation theory first. Finally, I comment briefly on the 
1 Canadian Social Science, 2014, 10(5), 39-47.
2 Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2010.
3 While I appreciate his close attention to certain aspects of the 2010 
book, the severity of his criticisms warranted a somewhat deeper 
look into my work, not simply the report on my work that I give in 
Comparative Theology.
third, constructive part of his essay, with its unexpected 
reference to the 1960s reforming Council of the Catholic 
Church, Vatican II, and the intriguing notion that 
Balagangadhara might make a constructive contribution 
to post-Vatican II attitudes toward the diversity of 
religions. 
It is important first of all to note how very critical 
the essay is .  From the essay’s subti t le  onward, 
Balagangadhara’s basic assertion is that I am disingenuous. 
This is a vice which he defines at the essay’s start by an 
appeal to the Oxford online dictionary: “not candid or 
sincere, typically by pretending that one knows less about 
something than one really does.” (p.39) Later, he clarifies 
“disingenuous” by noting that I am also “dishonest.” That 
he finds my work, and me, disingenuous and ultimately 
dishonest rests on his claim that comparative theology 
pretends to move to the borders between traditions, but 
in fact remains very much in the Christian mainstream, 
risking nothing at all. His sharp-edged assessment seems 
to depend on a distinction between theologians who stay 
at the center of their communities, and those who either 
move to the edge or, more usually, pretend to. It is not 
that Balagangadhara favors the former group, but that he 
seems ready to presuppose that a Christian theologian 
might be conceivably by comparative work move closer 
to the borders of other religious and theological traditions, 
but is more likely to hesitate and pull back. He claims that 
I do not in fact do much that can be counted as a departure 
from older Christian consumptions of the religious other:
It is important to notice how [Clooney] has walked the tightrope 
and what its results are. The sub-title of his book, deep learning 
across religious borders, suggests that inter-religious learning 
should not only be “deep” but also that it is possible only at 
those borders where religions meet each other. We know for a 
fact that most Christian theologians have stayed at the centre 
while relating to other religions. Clooney promises to stay within 
the confines of Christianity, even as he touches its borders. (p.40)
Staying within one’s own tradition, even while 
touching the borderline of another tradition, and perhaps 
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occasionally crossing it, seems to me a worthy intent, even 
if not the only path one might take. I did not include “only” 
in the subtitle, and did not make any claim in that regard. 
Balagangadhara, though, seems disappointed that I do not 
really approach the border at all, and therefore charges 
me with being disingenuous: I knew that I was not risking 
anything, and only pretended to, perhaps to impress 
readers such as himself. But borders are a complicated 
affair intellectually as in real life. Approaching them and 
even crossing them, with or without saying so, can be 
experienced and talked about in various ways. I am sorry 
that Balagangadhara does not contemplate the possibility 
of more than one expected outcome. 
In the middle part of the essay, he notes several 
references I make to my work in the 2010 book. Thus, 
referring to Chapter 6, which reproduces a plenary 
address I had given at the Catholic Theological Society of 
America in 2003, he quotes these words of mine: 
To visit this temple and stand before the Goddess Laksmi 
opened for me new possibilities of vision beyond what I had 
seen or thought before…I knew that according to the Hindu 
tradition I was also being seen by Her… 
I went on to say, 
There is no room for Laksmi in Christian theology, no easy 
theory that makes sense of Her presence…I suppose I might 
even have worshipped Her, because I was already there, as 
it was seeing and being seen. But Christians do not worship 
Goddesses, so I did not. 
That I do not worship Her—apart from seeing and 
being seen—is an honest claim. Intentionally, I give 
no reason, other than observing that Christians do not 
worship Goddesses. Intentionally too, I make no critique 
of the Goddess, and nowhere in any of my writings have 
I criticized the deities of Srivaisnavism, Narayana and 
Sri Laksmi. In any case, the cited passages are near the 
beginning of the lecture, and it followed by a series of 
reflections that show how I found a way beyond the 
impasse, through a series of productive visits to various 
religious possibilities, and finally toward a productive 
Christian theology that neither demeans the Goddess nor 
asks Christians to worship Her.4 Nothing in the rest of 
the essay—the real context for my remarks—is noted by 
Balagangadhara or makes it into his judgments. Rather, 
seemingly puzzled by my observation that Christians do 
not worship Goddesses, and apparently unclear why I 
mention this point, he devises his own interpretation:
There is one way to make sense of Clooney here: He is claiming 
that there is “no room” in Christian theology for Laksmi as 
a true Goddess. However, there is “room” for her as a false 
goddess. So, Clooney is saying this: There is no room in 
Christian theology for true goddesses, but there is room for 
4 I should note that I gave the lecture while writing my major book 
on the theme, Divine Mother, Blessed Mother: Hindu Goddesses 
and the Virgin Mary (2005); yes, I visited Her temple regularly, but 
my main work, then and now, is textual.
false goddesses. Because Christians do not worship the latter, 
Clooney does not worship Laksmi. If this is the case, why does 
he not say it openly and dissimulate instead? (p.42)
It is true that Christians do not worship Hindu goddesses; 
there is no room, no place in the church or in creed for 
such worship. One reason, the obvious one, might be that 
they are all false; another is that Christian monotheism, 
or Trinitarianism if you will, can leave no room for a 
Goddess. As I have already mentioned, I myself avoid 
pronouncements on truth and falsehood, and say simply, 
“I could have worshipped her, but do not.” The point 
is reinforced at the end of the same lecture (and the 
subsequent book chapter) where I express an admittedly 
Christocentric entrance upon real religious openness:
To be a Christian is simple and startlingly clear. We focus on 
Christ, we see everything. But, if so, we lose control. Every 
now and then, we find ourselves standing anew before God, 
in faces, voices, and words we did not know before. It may 
be a Laksmi in her temple, reminding us how the holy feels 
close up. Or the most beautiful Devi teaching us to see the 
divine clearly, materially, blissfully. Or Mary giving us hope 
by her brave witness, standing there at God’s death, or teaching 
us what it means not to be God, having no voice but God’s 
word. Or Sojourner Truth telling the stark truth about loving 
our neighbors, every one of them. Or Paul seeing Christ, right 
through all the separations we make. Or all the other things 
we see because we have seen these things first. (Comparative 
Theology, p.106)
In the CTSA plenary address and in the related 
book, I am appealing to my readers to learn from 
Goddess traditions, primarily through the study, but also 
through temple visits when possible. Learn; go there; 
see for yourself. But this appeal is of no importance to 
Balagangadhara, since he is eager to reduce my position 
to comfortable claims about truth and falsity, so that he 
can then expose my alleged concealment of my opinion 
that goddesses are only false goddesses. He finds it easier 
and more satisfying to propose his own theory—“Clooney 
is really saying that Goddesses are false and not to be 
worshiped”—and to show how that claim is woefully 
inadequate. But I was careful with what I said and did not 
say, and dwelled in the comparative moment. Reading the 
rest of the lecture, in the context of the 2010 book, makes 
clear where I started and where I ended. 
My presupposition is that not-saying is not hiding-
what-one-really thinks. To not-say can be powerful, and 
the 2003 lecture was not the first time I found it necessary 
to say less, and no more, precisely because of standing at 
the border between traditions. In my 2001 book, Hindu 
God, Christian God (Cloonet, 2001). I made a similar 
claim about Lord Siva, with a conviction that theological 
understanding and judgment, in the interreligious context, 
are never simple. After noting that my project was aimed 
at drawing Hindu and Christian theologians into the study 
of each other’s traditions, I added:
I may also disappoint those more determined readers who find 
that I did not in the end actually decide which God, religion, 
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or theology is the right one. I did not even say that Rahner’s 
theology of divine embodiment is superior to Arul Nandi’s or 
Vedanta	Desika’s.	I	did	not	conclude	that	Jesus	is	God	and	Śiva	
is not God. With annoyance they may point out that all I said 
was that theological decisions of that sort can in principle be 
made—and made persuasively—if someone is willing to do the 
work involved. I may therefore also disturb skeptics who believe 
that theological positions cannot be argued nor taken seriously 
as rational claims that might survive as true and applicable 
across linguistic, cultural, and religious boundaries. (Ibid., p.179)
I wrote this way not because I am disingenuous but 
because I care about the adequacy of language, and I 
respect the point at which one can no longer say certain 
things. In a way that predicts my 2003 lecture cited above, 
I deliberately put off, postpone, side-step the comfortable 
clarity about true and false that Balagangadhara is hoping 
for:
In the long run, then, the questions about God’s existence, 
presence and activity in the world, embodiment, and sacred 
word are questions that will entail great theological labor before 
they can be plausibly answered. In the short run, faith and reason 
must both do their work. On the one hand, I can assert the truths 
of the Christian faith without compromise; on the other, until 
the theological work is done, I can still state that these truths 
need to be tested in a comparative and dialogical conversation… 
I confess that Jesus is Lord, but I cannot now assert that Siva 
is not Lord nor that Narayana did not graciously undergo 
embodiment in order to enable humans to encounter their God. 
The work of the theologian is a work of faith and reason, and 
it is not complete until both have done the best they can. (Ibid., 
pp.180-181)
Not asserting something seems to me to be an honorable 
position particularly when, in such cases, I was not 
(disingenuously) speaking as if open-minded and as if 
careful about what I say and do not say, while (secretly, 
Balagangadhara supposes) knowing, and perhaps 
whispering to my co-religionists, that Siva is not divine, 
that Visnu did not undergo embodiment, and so forth. 
But in reading, it is better not to add words to what an 
author says, with the aim of being critical of the author 
for what he did (not) say. With respect to my experience 
in the Laksmi temple, then, I was simply not dealing 
with the issue of truth and falsehood. Balagangadhara is 
disappointed that he could not attack me on his chosen 
ground; so he moved me there for the sake of his argument. 
As a second example, Balagangadhara quotes my 
appeal that Christian readers can take seriously, take to 
heart, the mantras of the Srivaisnava Hindu tradition: “An 
interreligious reading should at least mean that a Christian 
reader takes the mantras to heart and finds in them a way 
to hear and utter anew prayers central to the bible and 
Christian tradition. When we pray ‘Abba, Father,’ we can 
learn to hear an echo of the Tiru Mantra.” (Ibid., p.80). 
His comment again reflects his desire to reduce the 
alternatives only to undesirable choices, as he adds a 
clarity I did not myself offer, as if he knows my mind 
better than I know it myself: “Of course, [Clooney] 
cannot possibly be saying the Narayana of the Vaishnavas 
is the God that Clooney worships.” (My emphases.) 
Balagangadhara seems to know more about me than I do, 
since my position was rather close to the position that 
Srivaisnavas and Catholics are in piety and theology not 
far apart when it comes to worship of God. My point, 
spelled out at length in the 2008 book, The Truth, the Way, 
the Life (Sebastian, 2008) and only summarized in the 
sections of the 2010 book Balagangadhara is looking at, 
is that before any judgment, we do well to attend to what 
Srivaisnava Hindus mean when, for instance, they call 
upon God as “Narayana.” For that purpose, I study (and 
list) the 108 meanings that Vedanta Desika, the great 14th 
century theologian, gives to that most holy name; and I 
point out that nearly all those 108 means are compatible 
with the Christian understanding of God. To a large extent, 
our understandings of God and therefore our prayers, as 
meaningful assertions about the deity, do share much in 
common, with greatly overlapping recognitions of the 
perfection of God. I do not say that Narayana is not the 
God Christians worship, but rather that a stark dichotomy 
—this God or that God—is a theologically unnecessary 
judgment. The point, spelled out more fully in the 2008 
book, is that we Catholics can take to heart and learn from 
the 108 meanings of “Narayana,” learning in a way that 
can figure in our prayer. 
Accentuating the controversial, Balagangadhara goes 
on to say, “In that case, a formidable question opens up: 
given that the Christians pray only to God and worship 
only Him, how can a mantra directed at some other 
entity ever help such a prayer?” (p.42) This is a fair 
question, that might have been posed constructively. 
But Balagangadhara’s interpretation, liberated from 
context and eliding the argument of the 2008 book 
(briefly referred to in the 2010 book), again reduces my 
intentions by over-clarification to a position he can then 
attack. In his opinion, what I really mean, though I do 
not say it, is that the Srivaisnava Hindus have “not yet 
found this ‘true God’” of Christianity. The real reason, he 
decides, is because I cannot hear the mantras properly, but 
merely misinterpret them in the standard Christian way. 
Ignoring the intent and goal of my exegesis of the holy 
name “Narayana” and my reading it in accord with the 
traditional Srivaisnava commentaries, for some reason he 
adds that I am recommending that Christians “not focus 
on the actual object of worship.” He thinks that what I 
mean to say, but did not say, is that Hindu prayers only 
echo true worship (p.43): 
When he prays ‘Abba, Father’, all that a Christian can learn 
to hear are the echoes of those others who have not yet found 
this ‘true God’. He cannot hear the sound of the mantra; all he 
“can learn” to hear is its mere echo. Clooney’s inter-religious 
reading only apparently does not focus on false gods; this lack 
of focus is only ‘apparent’ because the mantras cannot substitute 
for the Christian prayer, which is directed only at the true God. 
Clooney implicitly says is that even when men worship entities 
other than God, Christians should take cognizance of their 
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desire to worship the true God and not focus on the actual object 
of worship. If we do this, we can indeed hear the echoes of other 
‘religiosities’; after all, false religion is also religion. (p.43)
All this may tell us something about Balagangadhara’s 
view of Christian piety, but it has little to do with my 
position or what I wrote. In my view, the comparative 
process enables one to hear together the several prayers 
and mantras, and in hearing them together, in some way 
to enter upon the realities of which those prayers speak. 
My study of the mantras—and the names of God, the 
exegesis by Vedanta Desika, etc. —has nothing to do 
with the notion that Narayana is a “false god,” or with 
the notions of “true” and “false” religions—an idea that 
is outdated even in mainstream Catholic theology today. 
My work, as an honest (and not dishonest) attempt at 
learning, is aimed at inviting Christians to esteem what 
we can learn from the Srivaisnava worship of Narayana, 
and not to turn away from the evocative power of the 
mantras. Balagangadhara prefers to see my work as 
disingenuous and dishonest. 
Shifting then to an earlier part of the 2010 book where 
I reviewed the history of how Christians have approached 
other religions, Balagangadhara takes exception to my 
observation that “even the more enclosed medieval 
European Christian era was not lacking in instances of 
interreligious learning. We can think here of Aquinas’s 
dialogue with Jewish and Muslim thinkers in the Summa 
Theologiae.” He is not impressed, since he thinks that 
such learning was not possible. He asserts, somewhat off 
the point, that 
if Aquinas “learnt” from the Jewish and Muslim thinkers about 
his own religion through this dialogue, he must have learnt the 
most from Aristotle, a pagan thinker if ever there was one. If 
this is an instance of inter-religious learning, then the history of 
Christianity is the story of an unbroken process of inter-religious 
and intra-religious (surely, there were also “dialogues” with the 
heretics’) learning! (p.43) 
In Balagangadhara’s view here again my thinking is 
disingenuous, because he thinks that noting Aquinas’ 
learning would somehow be a blessing for each and every 
instance of supposed learning. That may be so, or at least 
interesting to debate, but Balagangadhara prefers a black 
and white judgment that serves to highlight the dishonesty 
of my comment. In my view, interreligious learning does 
happen all the time: no tradition is sealed off from others; 
even imperfect learning, flawed (and even sinfully so), 
can still be real learning. Learning from Aristotle does 
not cancel out learning from Ibn Sina or Maimonides. 
But Balagangadhara seems to want it to be the case that 
no Christian interreligious learning can be recognized or 
appreciated, if its motives and methods are not entirely 
clear in the way he would prefer.
Thereafter he makes the general claim that my 
comparative work is really all about showing that 
Hinduism is a false religion: “In short, when Clooney 
sets up a comparison between his ‘Hinduism’ and his 
Christianity, his own terms of description sets up a 
comparison between idolatry and the worship of the ‘true’ 
God, or between the true religion and the false religions.” 
(p.43) He says this, though the language and indictments 
accruing to charges of idolatry are nowhere discussed 
in my book, and nothing I say, in the 2010 book or 
elsewhere, supports the view that I think what is at stake is 
a contrast between true and false religions. In his view, the 
old missionaries were at least honest: “Historically, that is 
how Christianity set up the debate. But the virtue of that 
old discussion is that these ideas have been proclaimed 
openly and honestly by their proponents. Clooney, 
however, does not do so; he dissimulates instead.” (p.43) 
Pushing home his point, he argues that either I am not a 
Christian believer, or that my work, ignoring the Hindu 
insistence on “faith in experience” and not “experience of 
faith,” is actually no learning at all: 
Clooney has not touched any religious border in any sense of the 
term. His “deep learning” is disingenuous: It hides the fact that 
there is no learning. His distance from the early theologians is a 
vanishing point and woefully inadequate to understand diversity, 
whether Ancient or modern.
Balagangadhara does not explain this harsh judgment, 
which requires that he reads my mind (apparently in lieu 
of reading my books) in order to pass judgment on my 
scholarship and theology, for the sake of the conclusion 
that my work is “woefully inadequate.” He has thus 
moved with great haste from the obvious fact that much 
more is to be said on the topic of how Christians and 
Hindus are to relate, to what he thinks is a clear proof of 
the total failure of my comparative theology, which is for 
some reason a matter of “hand-wringing,” obliviousness 
to the questions he finds central, and again, proof of the 
disingenuous:
The nebulous and vague story of Clooney [in giving a sketch of 
“Hinduism”] does not even begin to capture the questions that 
the Indian culture and her ‘religions’ have faced and continue to 
face. In this sense, if there is to be a true inter-religious dialogue, 
one needs honest and open discussions and not merely some 
well-intentioned hand-wringing…
Rather, he adds, Clooney “has demonstrated his 
inability even to suspect the questions that underlie the 
task.” This in turn enables Balagangadhara to make 
what he finds to be a clarion call: “It is high time that 
intellectuals ‘open their eyes’ and ‘look newly’ at this 
reality, instead of being disingenuous if they want to seek 
truth.” (p.46) Insofar as this means that scholars like me 
can learn from scholars like him, I can only agree; I have 
respect for his scholarship. But insofar as his notions are 
now to serve as the measure for truth and honesty, there is 
no reason to agree with him. 
Similarly, when I point out that the missionaries, even 
as apologists and intent upon conversions, did in fact 
learn a great deal about the religions of Asia, often as 
the pioneers of this learning, Balagangadhara will have 
no part of this measured acknowledgment of their study 
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and learning. Again accusing me of “hand-wringing”— 
oddly missing even the affect of my writing—he now 
judges that I am asking for applause, deliberate in my 
obfuscations, (again) disingenuous, and finally, at long 
last, “dishonest:” 
When [Clooney] wrings his hands because he finds polemics 
“creeping” into even the most “energetic efforts to learn,” one 
feels like throwing up one’s hands; what precisely were the 
missionaries so ‘energetically’ trying to learn? They were in 
India to convert people into Christianity and preach the Gospels. 
What were they supposed to learn except how to fulfill their 
vocation properly? Surely, all their ‘learning’ was an integral 
part of this endeavour. Clooney’s deliberate obfuscations here 
are not merely disingenuous; they are dishonest as well. (p.45)
As with Aquinas, it is quite fair to argue that the 
missionaries were studying the texts they had access too, 
observing rituals, customs related to birth and death, 
marriage and the ownership of property, and they were 
studying the languages as best they could. They were 
really learning—not “merely learning”—energetically and 
in very difficult circumstances. But Balagangadhara has 
decided that because the missionaries were missionaries, 
real learning was not their goal; and such learning was 
impossible anyway. But his standards are too high, at 
least regarding others. Much learning occurs in imperfect 
situations, pursued by people biased in their dispositions. 
It happens even today.
Here I must back up a bit. Although the criticisms 
of comparative theology as exemplified in my work 
constitute the distinctive middle section of the essay, 
the part that readers will notice, what really matters for 
Balagangadhara himself is his own theory of translation, 
put forward in the first pages of the essay. Translation 
is difficult, complicated, and it is hard to know if one 
is getting it right. Insistence on an incommensurability 
of cultures would make this impossible, while the 
assumption of universal commonalities would make 
translation seem very easy, when it is not, and would 
render it vulnerable to one culture’s—usually that of 
the modern West—notion of the universal. So one must 
clarify the grounds on which one thinks cross-cultural 
and interreligious communication are possible. All of 
this is interesting, translation is a wonderful and vexing 
topic, and Balagangadhara’s insights are worthy of 
consideration. 
But as the essay is written, that first part, with its 
interesting thoughts on the problem of translation, is 
made to serve as the measure for anything to be said in or 
about the comparative work. Balagangadhara’s references 
to comparative theology and my work serve only to 
show how things go wrong when one does not follow 
theoretical strictures such as he proposes. This is why 
in the second part of the essay he shows little interest in 
my actual reading of Hindu theological texts, my actual 
work of translation, or any of my other books, but finds it 
sufficient to take the 2010 book as sufficient proof of the 
disingenuous, dissimulating, and dishonest nature of my 
work. 
And so, after concluding the first part of his essay by 
a series of good questions about translation from Sanskrit 
to English, with attention also to who decides which is 
a good translation or not, he decides that comparative 
theology must be judged by whether or not it takes up his 
questions: “These are some of the questions that a twenty-
first century comparative theology faces in its quest. Thus, 
Clooney must confront these questions and seek answers.” 
Unless those questions are front and center, nothing new 
will occur:
If Clooney does not take up this job, there is only one route open 
to him: he has to presuppose as true what requires the proof of 
its truth. That is, he has to presuppose the truth of the ‘consensus’ 
that has emerged from centuries of habitual Christian-theological 
thinking about self and the other. Inevitably, his ‘comparative 
theological study’ will then end up reproducing the very same 
descriptions that Christian theology has produced of the Indian 
culture and its traditions for centuries. (pp.41-42)
We all benefit from new challenges. But as the core of his 
essay, reviewed above, shows, Balagangadhara already 
knows that Clooney has not risen to the occasion and 
has sought to elude the honest work Balagangadhara 
has assigned him. As a result, Balagangadhara opines, 
nothing new emerges, no new learning can take place. 
Comparative theology is a failure, as will be any learning 
that does not first deal with the issues he thinks important. 
His notion of translation turns out to be the only real 
counter to “centuries of habitual Christian-theological 
thinking about self and other.” The actual work of 
translation – such as often fills my books—cannot matter, 
just as the serious reading of Hindu commentators cannot 
matter, since such work must always lead to the “same” 
views that have always been held by people like me. This 
is why Balagangadhara is eager to turn my examples— 
the Goddesses, the names of Narayana, the learning of 
Aquinas, etc. —into either/or dichotomies that prove the 
disingenuous and dishonest nature of my work. 
Of course, this is not the only way to proceed. By 
contrast, were his goal to assess my work with respect 
to the old and recent ways Christians have talked about 
religions, it would have been necessary to do much more 
work on the Catholic theology of religions, so as to 
situate my theology and theological practice within the 
Christian theological tradition, comparing and contrasting 
it with that of other Catholic theologians—even with 
the work of other Jesuit scholars of Hinduism, over the 
past centuries. Without such further study, “Translation, 
Interpretation and Culture” lacks context. It turns out to 
be a theory searching for verification, and a search that 
finds my work a handy foil in showing the virtues of 
Balagangadhara’s own work. Sadly, this could have been 
done in a constructive manner, not so dismissive and 
partial, and I would have been happy to hear and learn 
from Balagangadhara’s views. 
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The last part of the essay seems to be intended to move 
beyond the criticism of Clooney toward a constructive 
proposal regarding what should happen if anything is to 
change. Here Balagangadhara takes the briefest look at the 
brief Vatican II document “Nostra Aetate” (1965), reading 
it in terms of his preferred language of “cultures.” Without 
further ado he calls for new theological work: “We need 
to begin serious theological reflections on phenomena that 
exist in India and not undertake ‘comparative theologies’ 
when under the sway of dogmas quasi-universally held 
in the West for centuries.” (p.47) At this point he seems 
to have put aside the problem of Clooney and Clooney’s 
disingenuousness, dissimulation, and dishonesty, in order 
to call for fresh thinking, daring thinking, such as he 
himself exemplifies:
However, now, as then, we need people who dare think and 
rethink what we see in this world and of what it is made up. If, 
as then, we seek truth and intend to move forward, we need to 
question radically our inherited experiences of the world and 
the staid dogmas that sustain them. This is the task facing us in 
Nostra Aetate, our time, which is the world of the twenty-first 
century and beyond. (p.47)
It is unexpected but pleasant to see that Balagangadhara 
apparently now includes himself in the “us” posed a new 
task after “Nostra Aetate,” a document that, as a whole, 
merits a potentially interesting Hindu reading. But while 
he seems to laud “Nostra Aetate,” despite its notion of 
the reflection of rays of the light of Christ, he hasn’t here, 
at least, read the document as a whole, nor in light of the 
complicated history of Jewish-Christian relations that are 
its real starting point. Similarly, the conciliar document’s 
own and different history, at the Council and in five 
decades of scholarly writing about it, make no appearance 
here. My own work is possible only in the post-Vatican II 
Church.5 Nevertheless, Balagangadhara seems already to 
have decided that comparative work such as I do cannot 
possibly help in the “rethinking” that is required after 
Vatican II, his preferred “radical questioning” of our 
experiences and dogmas. 
Driven by the purity of his views and constrained 
by the rigor of his judgments, Balagangadhara seems to 
think that every statement needs to fall into an either/or 
dichotomy; otherwise it is disingenuous and ultimately 
dishonest. Any language of complexity and shadings of 
gray, such as I suggest over and again, cannot be anything 
but a cover for the black and white views he loves to 
find and then to hate. Since I do not fit into his template, 
I must be disingenuous and dishonest in my work. To 
his disappointment, the history of religions and the 
history of theologies of religious others are always more 
complex and more mixed than he prefers. His desire for 
an argument on the simplest grounds and in validation of 
his own views, shows his fiery determination to be proven 
right. The effect unfortunately is to give off much heat 
and little light. 
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